Fishing down the food chain is a controversial issue that demands further exploration. Redfeed is a marine species located on the second to last level on the food web. It is also one of the potential saviors of the aquaculture industry. The role of effective management of this species is of utmost importance to avoid the potential catastrophe associated with its overharvesting. Using a calculation of behavioral effectiveness, a blueprint redfeed regime is compared with the Convention for the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), an ecosystem-based management regime with the now famous krill as its key species. Though the regimes are similar in nature, their geopolitical differences suggest that a future redfeed regime will be effective even though CCAMLR has not been. Ensuring that the redfeed is not merely incorporated into existing regimes, but is treated separately in an ecosystem-based regime, will alleviate the interplay this future redfeed regime otherwise would encounter.
Introduction
Redfeed is a marine species that has the potential of ameliorating the expansion of a hard-pressed aquaculture industry in Norway and abroad. This industry of farmed fish and other species has seen record export numbers worldwide in the last decades. Its national expansion is therefore a priority for both the industry itself and the Norwegian government specifically. Processed redfeed has been confirmed through onsite testing
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The Journal of Environment & Development 19(2) to be compatible with the aquaculture industry's demands for raw material to feed as well as natural pigmentation for farmed salmon. Therefore it is probable that harvest will commence within few years Tokle 2006; Hynes, Egeland et al. 2009 ). The technological challenges to harvesting such small individuals as redfeed have not yet been perfected though. Given this, the formation of a unified international management regime in the area for the species has still not reached the end of the agenda formation stage (Young 1998) . Once it does though, the movement to the negotiation stage of regime creation will likely be swift. The role of cooperation both nationally and internationally in the development of a management regime regulating this harvest is thus of great importance to avoid potential overharvesting and destruction of the ecosystem. Furthermore, effective management past the operationalization stage of the regime is critical. This article will work within this context to determine whether an ecosystem-based international management regime for redfeed can be effective and attempt to predict positive or negative interplay with already existing regimes in the area.
Management of a common property for its preservation is often provided by the establishment of an international regime for a given issue area as a response to collective-action problems associated with this property's incapacity of being used on individualistic terms. Within this framework, the following article will discuss a blueprint for a potentially new Calanus finmarchicus (redfeed) regime in the Northeast Atlantic and the possible interplay this regime will have with already existing regimes in the area, and whether this in turn will affect the effectiveness of the regime. The first section will discuss the resource itself and its importance given facts about population increases, declining fish stocks, and the diminishing supply of feed for the aquaculture industry. The following section will then discuss international regimes and their effectiveness in general followed by a discussion of the natural comparable regime to the blueprint redfeed regime-The Convention for the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). The third section will then consider these two regimes against each other to determine whether or not a redfeed regime has the potential of being effective in terms of compliance in light of the experiences of CCAMLR. Having determined that the redfeed regime will likely be behaviorally effective, it will be explored whether or not interplay between already existing regimes in the area, specifically the mixed Norwegian-Russian fisheries commission, may affect the effectiveness of this regime. 193 generation, which continues to develop during spring, descends into the depths during the summer once they have accumulated high enough contents of lipids and are ready for overwintering (Overrein ; Fisheries Research Services 2005) . This descent, which is the stage at which researchers suggest that redfeed ought to be harvested due to this high content of lipids, occurs in different areas in the North East Atlantic at different times during spring and summer, depending on currents and water temperature (Tokle 2006) . This naturally makes the preferred time of harvest different from south to north, due to the later warming of ocean water in the north as opposed to the warmer waters farther south earlier in the summer. Figure 1 gives a snapshot of redfeed locations and abundance thereof along the Norwegian coast. The figure shows an abundance that is located within international waters and the Norwegian, Faeroe Island and EU exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Norwegian Sea. This is the area frequented by among others the spring spawning herring, which swims several thousand kilometers far out to sea for the sole reason of feeding on redfeed before returning to the coast of Norway to spawn (Årnes 2007) .
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At all stages of its development, redfeed is the main food source for several major commercial fish stocks in the North East Atlantic, both larvae and adult, such as the aforementioned spring spawning herring, mackerel, cod, and the capelin. The latter, capelin, is in turn the main food source of cod in the Barents Sea, thereby exemplifying the food web of which redfeed is a part. Considering its importance as prey of these significant stocks in the Norwegian and adjacent seas Kwasniewski, Hop et al. 2003; Melle, Ellertsen et al. 2004) , the importance of its effective management is illuminated. The promises of this new biomass are plentiful and tempting, however. Redfeed is the most abundant of all species in the waters surrounding Norway, with a biomass that at times is estimated at around 21 to 28 million tonnes dry weight in the Norwegian and the Barents Sea respectively. Given the enormity of its volume, it was suggested at the proposal stage, for what later became known as the Calanus-project, that an outtake of 10% of the redfeed biomass would lead to a doubling of the total biomass outtake from the oceans on a yearly basis (Strategic Programme Description 2001; . Furthermore, simulations have later suggested that if one were to reduce the overwintering stock of female redfeed by as much as 50%, the effects would still not be critically damaging to the following generation of the zooplankton. Research actually suggests such a dramatic outtake at the bottom of the food web may in fact be positive overall, as the following generation of overwintering redfeed would only be reduced to 87% of that of the year prior with a 50% outtake of females due to among others less competition for resources for the remaining zooplankton. Similar results have also been confirmed through laboratory testing (Slagstad and Tande 2005; Tokle 2006) . Naturally, this has not gone by unnoticed or without protest by environmentalists and scientists alike (Pauly, Christensen et al. 1998) . Redfeed is located at the trophic level of the marine food web only second from the bottom. Harvesting redfeed would therefore be the exemplification of harvesting down the food chain and displacing the problem of over consumption by attacking the layer that supports it all. However, as
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The Journal of Environment & Development 19(2) Figure 2 demonstrates, harvesting at a lower trophic level on the marine food chain is possibly not negative but could in fact be interpreted as positive. Figure 2 shows how human beings feed on both the marine and the agrarian food chains. The lower field represents how we feed on land. The size and placement of the figure demonstrates how humans primarily feed on the first and second level on land, but on the third, fourth, and fifth level on the marine food chain. We also feed in much lower volume from the ocean, as opposed to from land. This relates to the link in the chain from which we feed. Scientists have shown that for each level we ascend on the food chain, we lose more than 90% of all available energy Tokle 2006) . From this we can deduce that we currently only harvest about 1% of all available marine energy by prioritizing the equivalent of the lions and the wolf Figure 1 . Station scores along the second PCA axis. High scores denote high abundance of C. glacialis CI-CIV and C. hyperboreus, and low scores denote high abundances of C. finmarchicus. Source: Jongman et al. (2000) .
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and the humans of the ocean, rather than the marine pig, chicken, and grains, namely, zooplankton and phytoplankton. One conclusion is that it might actually be safer to harvest farther down the food chain due to the immense increase in volume the lower down the food chain one harvests. The figure thus demonstrates that we have yet to explore the immense volume of resources available to us in the ocean, and that, to increase food supply worldwide, we might have to (Tiller 2008) .
The importance of commencing a fishery at a lower trophic level on the marine food web than what is customary is thus well documented and has been the focus of much research in the later years (Overrein; Calanus Project Description 2001; Melle and Olsen 2002; Dragland 2005; Olsen, Moren et al. 2006; Tokle 2006; Havforskningstema 2006 nr. 1; Bailey 2007) . This research has been critical given that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has observed a visible decline in the number of fish stocks that can be used for human consumption or as feed in the Aquaculture industry at all, not to mention be fished at higher rates than today. Of all fish stocks worldwide, 52% are overfished, and around 28% are extinct or trying to recover after years of overfishing. Only about 20% of all fish stocks were in 2007 not overfished and had a potential of having their quotas increased before these also would possibly become vulnerable to overfishing. This figure was down from 25% in 2005 (Saltnes 2002 The Journal of Environment & Development 19(2) Naturally, these are not positive numbers. Given this, it is possible that to increase the amount of marine nourishment by a method that is sustainable it will become necessary to search for alternative solutions. The Aquaculture industry has long been heralded as the international savior, given that the industry has contributed 27% of the total marine production worldwide during the previous years (Tacon, Hasan et al. 2006) , and has had a average rate of growth of 8.8% since 1970. These are positive numbers isolated and can be a contributor of optimism. The Aquaculture industry, however, is itself a contributor of diminishing stocks of wild fish worldwide.
This industry more than doubled its worldwide production of farmed fish from 1986 to 1996 (Naylor et al. 2000) . This increase demands enormous amounts of fish feed, primarily in the form of fishmeal and fish oil. Of all marine production based on wild fish worldwide in 2005, 31% were transformed to fishmeal and fish oil. About 81% of the oil and 46% of the fishmeal were then used by the Aquaculture industry (Tacon, Hasan et al. 2006) . This is clearly not sustainable use of the oceans resources, especially considering the hope that the industry will raise its production so that there will be a net increase of marine products worldwide in the near future (Tacon, Hasan et al. 2006) . Given the industry's consumption of wild fish in the form of fish meal and fish oil, however, it is in fact a net consumer of wild fish rather than being a contributor. Salmon, as the prime example from Norway, consumes three to four times its own weight in wild fish in the form of fishmeal and fish oil (Dragland 2005) .
This was also the background for the commencement of the original Calanus project in Norway, fueled by the needs of the Norwegian Aquaculture industry, which accounts for 33% of the global production of farmed salmon (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture department 2009). Their needs in turn were based on concerns over governmental promises of expanding the aquaculture industry exponentially in spite of the apparent finite sources of marine oils (Regjeringen Stoltenberg II 2005) . The marine oils salmon and other farmed species obtain through the consumption of these marine products in the form of fish feed are demanded by consumers, because it is one of the nutritional benefits of consuming fat fish like salmon. These marine oils can therefore only to a small extent be substituted with agricultural equivalents. Results from Norwegian research on lower trophic level sources of marine oils (Calanus Project Description (Fiskeridirektøren 2006) . Furthermore, the technological challenges to harvesting such small individuals as redfeed have not yet been perfected. Given this, the formation of a unified single international management regime in the area for the species has still not rea ched the end of the agenda formation stage of regime formation (Young 1998) and no commercial harvest is on the verge of launching. Clearly though, once these elements are in place, harvest will commence. Thus thorough plans for managing the species and those dependent on it will have to be in place prior to such a launch, and have been in progress for several years.
A Redfeed Regime in the North East Atlantic
Fortunately for a future redfeed regime, there is much to be learned from regime theory in general, and a comparison with the only existing ecosystem-based management regime where plankton is a key species, namely, CCAMLR. Considering regimes in general, it is customary to characterize an international regime by a set of principles, norms, rules, and procedures for making decisions about a specific issue of importance to several actors in the international arena. The regime is in the end aimed at a specific task, namely, solving or ameliorating socioeconomic, environmental, and/or political issues that are or could become a problem for stakeholders in the area (Krasner 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 2000; Stokke 2007 ). Importantly, however, in the case of redfeed and the North East Atlantic specifically, is the often asked question why there has to be a separate regime for redfeed in the first place. In other words, why cannot redfeed as a resource be incorporated into already existing fisheries regimes in the North East Atlantic to which Norway is already a member and where the institutional framework is already in place?
The need for a redfeed regime is most easily summed up by Article 63 in Section V of the UN Law of the Sea on Stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it. This article states that in the case of harvestable stocks existing within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of more than one coastal state and in surrounding international waters, the affected coastal states must agree on coordinative measures through regional organizations as to which conservation and development to emphasize on the stock in question (UNCLOS EEZ Section V 1982). Redfeed straddles the borders of several nations' economic zones, and is also present in large quantities in international waters. Figure 3 shows a map of the various economic zones
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The Journal of Environment & Development 19(2) in the area in question. Redfeed floats with the ocean currents through most of these economic zones and international waters and is ready for harvest at different times at the different locations depending on water temperature and ocean currents any given year.
In the North Sea, for instance, redfeed has long been the most critical feed for all commercial fish stocks, especially cod, but this is also an area where the species has seen a dramatic decline lately, possibly due to the changing water temperature. Though the disappearance of redfeed is thought to be due to climate change and not wrongful harvesting, this shows how vulnerable the management of the species as a whole is. It is hypothesized that redfeed has disappeared from this area due to climate changes forcing the pathway of the redfeed to veer north before entering the North Sea. It thereby pushes larger than usual amounts of plankton into these waters farther north, In the Norwegian Sea, on the other hand, where the main base of zooplankton is located, the spring spawning herring travels thousands of kilometers to feed on it before returning to the coast to spawn (Årnes 2007) . The international spring spawning herring management regime consists of, in addition to Norway, the EU, Russia, Iceland, and the Faeroe Islands (Fiskeri-og Kystdepartementet 2009 ). The management of the spring spawning herring is naturally also critical, especially because currently the biomass of redfeed in the Norwegian Sea is at its lowest since measurements started in 1997 (Falkenhaug and Omli 2009 ). In the Barents Sea as well, the measured biomass of redfeed has declined in the past few years. This has been primarily blamed on the capelin. Capelin is a large staple in the diet of the cod. The decline in redfeed has happened simultaneously with the increase in capelin, which in turn has had an effect on the volume of cod in the area (Knutsen and Dalpadado 2009) . The Barents Sea area is also the stage for the annual mixed Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, which consists of several fisheries organizations from both nations, and which management of marine species can end up having interplay with the future redfeed regime (Fiskeri-og Kystdepartementet 2009 ).
In addition to the two regimes mentioned, several other regimes between Norway and other coastal states in this region exist. Some are general agreements and others are more species specific. These several international regimes account for the management of different marine species in both time and space in the North East Atlantic. They also demonstrate the need for a separate redfeed regime, so that the complexities surrounding not only the species itself but also more importantly the eco system as a whole, will be encompassed. Managing all the species that are critically dependent on redfeed on several levels across time and space implies a separate international ecosystem-based management regime. Considering regimes in a broad sense as agreements between nations over a specific issue area, we have shown that Norway is a member of several bilateral, three-way, and five-way negotiations with, among others, Russia, the EU, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and Greenland yearly over shared fish stocks in the areas where plankton floats, in addition to being members of NEAFC. These are regimes that cover such issue areas as the sharing of cod-quotas between Norway, Russia, and third nations in the Barents and Norwegian Sea, North Sea harvesting by the EU, mackerel quotas in the North East Atlantic shared between Norway, EU, and the Faeroe Islands and so on (Fiskeri-og Kystdepartementet 17 2007; Tiller 2008) . Incorporating redfeed into already existing regimes or agreements for harvesting in these waters would beg the question as to which, or all? Especially because redfeed is such a critical species and the cornerstone diet of most commercial plankton eating fish stocks featured in the already existing agreements.
Also, setting a quota for one area, such as the North Sea or the Norwegian Sea, could have consequences for another area, especially the Barents Sea, where Norway and
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The Journal of Environment & Development 19(2) Russia today harvest cod. If there is a diminished amount of redfeed floating into the areas around Svalbard due to over harvesting in areas further south, there would be less food for the species located at the final destination, such as capelin, on which cod in turn feeds. In other words, an all-encompassing international ecosystem-based management regime stipulating regulations on the harvesting of plankton is critical if there is to be a fair harvest of both the predator and the prey species for fishermen in these areas. Redfeed ought not to be considered within already existing regimes, because there are none that cover the entire areas and ecosystems in which redfeed floats. Rather than managing it as several separate stocks, this species needs to be considered as a whole across both time and space.
Effective Regimes
Having determined that a redfeed fishery should not merely be incorporated into already existing agreements in the North East Atlantic, but rather be considered as a whole in a separate agreement, the effectiveness of a potential redfeed regime must be discussed. Given that a regime is constituted under the premises of managing a given resource, or solving a problem that has arisen, such as overfishing or pollution, an effective regime would, for some, naturally entail the regime to solve these environmental issues within the designated time frame. In other words, has the environment improved for the given issue area for which the regime was created (Keohane, Haas et al. 1993; Zürn 1998; Helm and Sprinz 2000) ? Others may evaluate regime effectiveness from a legal perspective, where the question to be answered is whether environmental issues have been solved within the statutory framework of the given regime as well as international law and whether member nations have followed the rules and regulations they made a commitment to; in other words, compliance with regime regulations. One can therefore argue, purely definition wise, that effectiveness can be explored from an institutional or environmental perspective, where the former looks at the environmental problems being solved and the other looks at whether, in this process, there was compliance with the regime rules and regulations (Zürn 1998; Kütting 2000) . Naturally, considered strictly, the former often must depend on the latter to be realized, and the end product of the latter is most often the former. Regime effectiveness has other angles as well, however, that are quantitative rather than qualitative. Scientific discussions, such as the Oslo-Potsdam solution (Hovi, Sprinz et al. 2003 ) and the International Regime Database (RDB) (Breitmeier, Young et al. 2006) , have led to the creation of methods that are easier to measure than the more traditional qualitative methods of determining eff ectiveness due to its quantitative element.
For the purposes of this article, however, a method of qualitative research on effective regimes will be explored experimentally in this article. This method chooses to dissect effectiveness of regimes by discussing its output, outcome, and impact separately. A regime's output is its rules, regulations, and mechanisms for enforcement. Its outcome, on the other hand, is the behavior of those who are to be affected by the output, in other words, compliance with and enforcement of the output. The third Tiller 201 element, and the most important part for environmentalists, is the regime's impact on the environment through changes leading to a solution to the problem from which the regime was initiated in the first place (Young 2001) .
Given the complexities of studying an international regime that has not yet reached the stage of negotiations, and is thus merely theoretical at this stage, this study will focus on the exploration of the element of behavioral effectiveness through the use of a calculation introduced by Breitmeier et al (2006) . This calculation can be used to determine where problem areas of a given regime exist and investigate whether these can be avoided and how. In other words, rather than studying the output, outcome, and impact together, this article will focus on the only part of this threesome that is possible to give an educated prediction on before the fact, namely, the outcome. The article will assume environmentally sound output as a result of the negotiation stage of regime creation, and that the environmentally positive impact will follow positive outcome of behavioral effectiveness as measured by looking at compliance.
Can a Redfeed Regime Learn Anything From CCAMLR's Experiences?
To aid in this process, a comparison with a similar resource can aid the future regime greatly. Redfeed is on the same trophic level of the marine food web as a different yet similar plankton, namely, Euphausia superba (krill). Because an imaginary redfeed regime must be based on the entire food chain of which redfeed is a cornerstone species, it is useful to base it on an existing regime with similar conditions. CCAMLR is one such regime. The regime manages species based on the ecosystem as a whole (Fabra and Gascón 2008) , and also has plankton as a key species. Given that the cornerstone resources have the same location and importance on the food for both CCAMLR and the future redfeed regime, many of the same challenges will hypothetically be relevant for both regimes. The species is in both cases considered to be the most important species if the regime is to reach its goal of preserving the entire ecosystem in which they are to be harvested. Given that krill is already being harvested in the Southern Ocean, these challenges are immediate and current. We are hardly given any luxury of observing a current regime managing a nearly identical resource, with all its faults and successes, as a forthcoming regime soon will be. And not least, we are given the opportunity to learn from and respond to these faults and successes before the fact. This is what makes this comparison so enticing and unusual. Granted, some may point out comparative difficulties due to the differences politically and geographically between the areas in which CCAMLR operates and where redfeed will be harvested. This does not mean that the comparison isn't interesting and exciting or worthwhile. CCAMLR has been given vast media attention the last few years, and krill oil is being widely promoted in the health care industry. Given this attention, and that we are dealing with a similar species with similar end products, not to mention harvesting with similar possible consequences, the comparison is not only interesting but it is also of great importance. That CCAMLR in addition is considered ineffective
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The Journal of Environment & Development 19(2) by some ) makes it particularly interesting, because these effectiveness problems may be possible to avoid in a future redfeed regime, given enough foresight about the issues.
The comparative value of CCAMLR is the fact that it regulates the harvest of a similar resource as what will be harvested in the North East Atlantic. The cornerstone species being managed by CCAMLR is krill. CCAMLR was initiated after worries brought up by the Antarctic Treaty that concluded that if unregulated harvest of Antarctic species like krill remained without sustainable management, it could cause irreversible damage on the Antarctic ecosystem . Several marine and bird species, including the whale, feed on krill in the Southern Ocean. These species would be permanently damaged, possibly become extinct, if krill wasn't properly managed and preserved (Parkes 2000) . Article II of CCAMLR affirmed principles of preservation making sure that a species is only harvested in such quantities so that it would not threaten the future generation of the same species. This was deemed critical to maintain the ecological connection between the harvested species and those dependent on it or in some other way attached to it, as well as to minimize irreversible changes to the ecosystem . The result led to CCAMLR being signed in 1980, unofficially named the "krill convention" (Dommasnes, Iversen et al. 2004 ). The commission consists of 24 members. These members regulate the management of marine resources in the approximately 32.9 million sq. km CCAMLR area of the Southern Ocean (Nicol and Endo 1999) . This is done by laying the grounds for research, identifying the need for conservation, analyzing the effectiveness of rules and regulations, and formulating new ones when needed. The member nations are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the rules and regulations they have agreed to through negotiations after advice given them from their scientific committee. Through models developed to provide interaction, the commission can conclude and decide on what level of caution is necessary in a given case to ensure the sustainable harvest of both predator and prey, like krill. In addition to predator and prey issues, CCAMLR is also responsible to include other species in their ecosystem-based management scheme. These are species that could be affected by the physical presence of trawlers in the area through among others the drowning of birds caught in trawl nets, or marine mammals getting caught in or being hurt by trash released from vessels (CCAMLR 2001) . For the purposes of this behavioral effectiveness study, the focus will be on CCAMLRs management of krill. This study will prove informative in the discussion on the effectiveness of the future redfeed regime.
There are more than 80 species of krill, but it is the Antarctic krill that is the most numerous and has therefore been the focus of both research and harvest. Every individual krill can be up to 6 cm in length, exist in dense shoals that can be several kilometers in length, and can be fished by trawl. Acoustic measurements taken during the winter of 2000 alluded to there being a supposed biomass of 44 million tonnes in the area. Based on this, and considering the ecosystem-based management system CCAMLR uses for managing the resources in the area, the total krill quota of the area was set at 4 million tonnes evenly distributed over four set subareas (Dommasnes, Iversen et al. 2004 ).
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To what degree then can it be determined whether or not CCAMLR has been an effective regime? From an environmental perspective, we have argued that a regime is effective to the degree it reaches its goals and contributes to improve the environment in the given issue area for which it was created in the first place (Keohane, Haas et al. 1993; Zürn 1998; Helm and Sprinz 2000) . For the purposes of this study, however, we chose to look at the qualitative delimitations of output, outcome, and impact, focusing mainly on outcome as measured by Breitmeier et al.'s compliance calculation.
Prior to starting the study of CCAMLRs effectiveness, it is important to note that the regime is considered ineffective by, among others, Steinar . He has pointed out that one of the problems of the CCAMLR regime is that it was initiated almost a decade after the marine resources of the area had been harvested to already critically low levels. This is an argument that explains why the regime's goal of ecosystem management as a whole in the Southern Ocean has not been effective. In addition to this, it is argued that there is minimal law enforcement in the area, and that this also makes for poor effectiveness. One of the reasons for this lack of enforcement of regime regulations in the area has been and still is distance and the lack of an all-embracing coastguard responsible for the entire area and all vessels that travel therein. In addition to that is the fact that only the signatories to the convention are bound by its rules and regulations and that other nations therefore, on weak legal basis, can fish in this area as if it were international waters, irrelative of whether there is a legal regime in place and with few risks of being prosecuted in their flag state ). Other researchers (Breitmeier, Young et al. 2006 ) have also found that the regime is not effective regarding its goal according to the convention, though the IRD suggests that CCAMLR actually has been moderately causal of the original goal of the regime being effectuated, namely, the preservation of krill.
Regardless of these two different notions of what the regime's goal is (preservation of the ecosystem and managing krill) and whether it has been successful in reaching these goals, it is fair to argue that the regime still has not been put properly to the test for effectiveness considering the latter, namely, the management of krill. Despite the fact that member nations consistently have complied with CCAMLR quota regulations for krill, and that nothing implies that krill is endangered in the Southern Ocean, technical challenges regarding harvesting methods and instant preservation post harvest is the culprit (Nicol and Endo 1999) rather than regime's effectiveness itself. The actual situation is that regardless of very low quotas for krill these have never been fished to their completion by member nations. Krill harvest, prior to the current surge of factory trawlers, reached its top in 1982 when just a little over 500,000 tonnes, of a quota allowance of nearly 2,000,000 for the entire CCAMLR area, was harvested . The technical issues could now be solved though, and the Norwegian businessman Kjell Inge Røkke, with his company Aker BioMarine, is well underway with their Southern Ocean krill fairy tale with technical difficulties apparently overcome (Olsen 2007; Rønning 2007) .
What is needed thus is an evaluation of whether or not the regime has the required elements for effectiveness in place at all given that it is being tested in real time. In
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An Effectiveness Calculation
Using Breitmeier et al.'s calculation of behavioral effectiveness enables us to have a solid comparable element from which the potential effectiveness of a redfeed regime can be discussed. The elements needed for regime effectiveness, when compliance is used as a measure of outcome and output and impact is taken as a positive given and natural result, as suggested by Breitmeier et al. are Horizontal enforcement + strong mechanisms for verification + legalization + participation by voluntary organizations + institutional development = high compliance with regime rules (2006) . CCAMLR does have horizontal enforcement of its rules and regulations. Each member nation has inspectors who may board all vessels of other signatories to the convention and be treated as a national inspector when it so happens. This inspector will then give his or her rapport to the flag state under which the vessels sails, who in turn is responsible for criminal prosecution of the ship owner when necessary. Verification is done by the same inspector through picture documentation and rapports that are commented and signed by the captain onboard the inspected vessel. These pictures and rapports are then sent to the flag state that in turn is responsible for transferring these to the regime secretariat. Both enforcement and verification are thus in theory taken care of by the regime, but the physical disconnection between the member nations to the Antarctic makes them barely living letters. The lack of physical presence of inspecting vessels, in addition to the problems of vessels sailing under flags of convenience, unfortunately makes it difficult for these two elements to have a real life effect.
Legalization is the third element in the equation, and stands for the process that makes sure the rules and regulations are clear, relevant, logical, adaptive, and consistent; the process also needs to be internalized in the member nations so that they become an integral part of domestic politics and internal norms as well (Breitmeier, Young et al. 2006) . The remoteness of the Antarctic is something most member nations of CCAMLR have to handle in addition to the importance of preserving resources so distanced from their own territory. To impress a wish of preserving the Antarctic with strict regulations can be easy so long as it does not involve economic losses for the member nations. Now that a krill fishery is an actuality, at least from a Norwegian vantage point, it is a possibility that the CCAMLR regime will be tested for the first time regarding its original goal. Because companies are already discussing sailing under different flags to gain access to this fishery, one may argue that the regime has been warned in advance about its members putting personal gain ahead of collective environmental conservation. Legalization has thus not been internalized by member nations to the convention, at least not when personal economic gains are at stake.
Participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the fourth part of the effectiveness equation, has been suggested as a tool for increased knowledge by the convention . These organizations have permission by the convention to present documents to the secretariat; documents that in turn can be approved as official by the commission at a later stage (Wiser 2000) . CCAMLR, however, also has a clause that gives each member of the commission the right to exclude NGOs from specific meetings. Regardless of clauses or permissions, participation is low, and is often dependent on an invitation, and there is only one occasion when CCAMLR has asked for a declaration of support from an NGO (Oberthür, Müller et al. 2002) . On its face, it is therefore arguable that there is not a close knit relationship between NGOs and CCAMLR, and that this can be considered negative concerning enforcement and compliance for the regime.
Regarding the last element of the equation, institutional development, one can however see that there has been a move in the positive direction, given that the regime has developed over the years since its initialization in 1982. Given some research that suggests that compliance increases with time and experience (Breitmeier, Young et al. 2006) , there is hope that this element will prove beneficial once the regime is tested concerning a krill fishery (Rønning 2007) .
Through this equation of compliance, we have determined that CCAMLR lacks positive signs in most of its substantial parts. The elements of horizontal enforcement and verification had positive signs, though only in theory, because in reality, the lack of surveillance and central organs behind enforcement makes it words only in the convention. Due to the size of the enforceable area, the distance to shore, and lack of permanent harbor, it is clear that effective management is difficult at best. Legalization is equally complicated by the distance to the Antarctic, because the lack of proximity to the area makes the member nation's inhabitants detached from the issue area; distance does not make the heart grow fonder when it comes to resource management. Participation by NGOs is not something that characterizes the regime either, but institutional development, the final element of the equation for compliance, is something that absolutely may have increased the member nation's confidence in the rules and regulations of the regime.
The general problem CCAMLR has had to deal with regarding behavioral effectiveness evaluations, thus, is the problem of distance, which includes not only the issue of member nations being distanced from the regime area but also more importantly, the inhabitants of the given member nation being distanced from the direct effects of nonmanagement. Thus despite CCAMLR having reached the unwritten regime goal from an environmental perspective-namely, preserving krill from being extinct-it has however not been thoroughly tested on these grounds given the technological obstacles that have so far prevented a full blown krill fishery to commence. The experiences from conventional fisheries in the area have confirmed these theories and it is therefore argued that CCAMLR is ineffective by some researchers ) as a management regime on general grounds, given its compliance issues and lack of a central authority to enforce rules and regulations. It is based on the elements from the compliance equation that a comparison with a fictional redfeed regime can be made and lessons from CCAMLR be deduced so that the former may be a success.
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Blueprint for a Future Effective Redfeed Regime
The biological similarity between the two plankton species in question, krill and redfeed, in addition to their being enormous unexplored resources of marine oils, makes their respective regimes comparable in the broad sense. Given the similarities of issue area, one may expect that the experiences of the two regimes will have similar features. However, it has been determined that the central problem for CCAMLR was location and the lack of a central enforcing authority due to distance. One may therefore actually expect the situation of a redfeed regime to be radically different because this element cannot be held constant. The comparison will be made from the perspective of an international management regime for redfeed in the North East Atlantic, specifically from a local Norwegian vantage point.
Breitmeier et al.'s equation for compliance was as described in the CCAMLR case: horizontal enforcement + strong mechanisms for verification + legalization + participation by voluntary organizations + institutional development = high compliance with regime rules (2006) . A redfeed regime will not have the same strain on enforcement and verification as CCAMLR does, given that there is an already well-established culture of cooperation between nations in the Northeast Atlantic fisheries sector. The area in which redfeed can be harvested is at almost all times within a given nation's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and therefore regulated by that nation's coastguard. Only a confined area where redfeed floats is international water and these areas are managed by the international regime, the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). The member nations to this regime are in turn the same nations whose EEZs are waters where redfeed floats and whose cooperation is already well functioning (NEAFC 2007) .
Legalization is furthermore much easier in waters that are in close proximity to member nations of a given regime, especially when in addition the resource is critically linked to the biomass of other important fisheries resources in the same area. Internalizing the critical importance of managing redfeed properly is therefore not equally problematic in the Northeast Atlantic as it is in the Southern Ocean, because fishermen in the former area know that if badly managed, not only redfeed but also commercial fish stocks they already depend on for a livelihood will suffer. The ripple effects of badly managed krill, however, do not reach the local fisherman as easily from the Southern Ocean. Selling a costly management agenda for redfeed is much easier when the affected parties may stand to loose it all if the investment is not made.
As for the element of NGO participation, it has been argued that it is important that there is an openness and an invitation of cooperation between those governing and especially environmental and fisheries organizations. In Norway, this cooperation is already well and broadly established, especially in the fisheries sector, with many fisheries organizations being involved in most of the issues pertaining to the management of ocean resources (Tiller 2008 ). At least for Norway then, this is therefore an element of the equation that is positive at the current stage. At the dawn of a new international cooperative redfeed regime, it is important that this well-established openness with NGOs is transferred to the international arena as well.
Tiller
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Institutional development is something that will happen over time and will understandably not be in place from the start. However, the experiences government officials have from participation in other regimes in the area will have positive effects that may fastforward this process. Having almost all elements of compliance already effectuated prior to the actual regime being created is a good starting point for developing in the right direction though. Development can only happen with time, and it can be hoped that given the groundwork that has been laid, the regime will have a positive slope and encounter fewer challenges than had their situation been more similar to that of CCAMLR.
The stage is set for a redfeed regime and, given that the equation for potential of compliance with regime rules has many more positive elements than CCAMLR, it is probable that the regime will experience fewer bumps in the road than its comparable regime. CCAMLR, though created with the goal of preserving krill, which makes it comparable to a redfeed regime, has to struggle with geographical difficulties. Given that a future redfeed regime will be contextually situated within an area where fisheries cooperation and management is the norm, and where most all the elements required for compliance, and by extension, effectiveness, are in place, one can argue that behavioral effectiveness is probable.
Will Regime Interplay Affect Regime Effectiveness?
The fact that regimes exist, and that a redfeed regime should be in place within few years, naturally brings up the question of how institutions interact with one another both functionally and politically and whether this interplay affects the effectiveness of the regime in question. Originally, when regime interplay became an issue-area of interest, there were four categories of regime interplay identified by Young (1996) . Embedded regimes were considered to be regimes that were contextually rooted in institutional arrangements that arched broader principles and practices around the given regime, such as for instance the World Trade Organization (WTO). Nested regimes, on the other hand, are similar to embedded regimes though the institutional arrangements in question are in the same issue area, such as fisheries regimes being embedded within the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES). The third type of interplay identified by Young was clustered regimes, in other words, regimes that were intertwined into institutional packages, and the final type of interplay identified by Young was that of overlapping regimes. The final interplay type suggested was one where the function of one regime overlaps the precise function of another regime, thereby possibly creating conflict and effectiveness issues (Young 1996; .
These distinctions can be applied to fisheries regimes as well, as a fishery regime in general is usually part of a multitiered decision-making system, where each level is nested within one another, commencing at the top with the Law of the Seas Convention from 1982, the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the 2001 UN Fish Stock Agreement, all of which set the borders and established the rules and regulations that prescribe behaviors and enforcement rules in national and international waters. This tier is followed by regimes at the international level, directly and
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Other researchers, however, have emphasized other distinctions between regimes and their interplay. Though Stokke discusses Young's definition of interplay, he chooses to emphasize and employ the term institutional niches when discussing regime interplay and qualifies this by making an ecological metaphor. He clarifies by detailing the principle of competitive exclusion in ecology. He explains how no two species can occupy the same niche for a longer time period due to competitiveness, and essentially survival of the strongest species, whereby the other species either adapts to the stronger or is forced to either carve out its own niche or abandon the ecosystem as a whole. Any new institution in the Arctic and elsewhere would by this metaphor be expected to add new and unique value to the system, and deal with issues that it is better equipped for than other already existing institutions or bodies in the Arctic, or ultimately be vulnerable and subject to being considered wasteful and unnecessary (Stokke 2007) . A redfeed regime would by this description have to add something unique and invaluable that could not effectively be covered by the other already existing regimes by themselves, which was argued in section three.
Regime interplay, and whether this could have an effect on the behavioral effectiveness for the redfeed regime in the North East Atlantic, will for the purposes of this article concentrate on interplay with a major international agreement, namely, the mixed Norwegian-Russian Fishery Commission, which meets yearly and consists of several Norwegian and Russian fisheries organization and officials, and which allocates quotas for major fish stocks in the Norwegian and Barents Sea (Fiskeri-og Kystdepartementet 11 2007) . Both the commission and the future redfeed regime are regimes that are embedded, in that all fisheries regimes in the North East Atlantic negotiate agreements based on quota recommendations from ICES, whereby these quotas are distributed amongst nations in their respective regimes. A redfeed regime, as the commission, would also be embedded into the already existing pattern of information flow from ICES to regimes to national legislation (Tiller 2008) , and that the percentile zonal attachment of redfeed to Norway would be arguably high, as identified by ICES (Hoel 2006) . The redfeed regime would, however, have the added element of having its key managed species be prey to all major plankton eating commercial fish stocks being managed. This would make its interplay one of interconnection. As such, this article will include a category of interplay labeled interconnected interplay, to signify that species of one regime is critically connected to that of another one, where quotas of one may critically affect that of the other.
Given this interconnectedness, a blueprint redfeed regime would have to be based on a system like that of CCAMLR, with an ecosystem approach to fisheries management. With a setup from an ecosystem perspective, a redfeed regime would not only distribute quotas set by ICES to the parties interested in harvesting the plankton but would also have to consider ICES quotas set for species that are predator of the plankton and species that would be affected otherwise through for instance increased pollution. ICES would give quota recommendations for the yearly redfeed stock as a whole. All the while, regimes encompassing species such as herring, cod, and capelin, to name a few, and all predators of redfeed harvested in different locations at different times in the year will be subject to redfeed quotas aligned to their harvesting times and places so as not to disturb the natural balance between them. The mixed Norwegian-Russian commission and the redfeed regime would therefore have some functions that would be related in that the redfeed regime would have to consider what this and other regimes may decide about quota distributions of stocks that are interconnected to redfeed. These regimes would in turn have to consider the distribution and size of redfeed stocks at any given location where cod or herring is to be harvested to discern whether the areas where cod is harvested will be affected by lower stocks of redfeed and if the quotas set for this area would have to be adjusted due to this fact.
The effect this interplay will have on the effectiveness of the redfeed regime is only speculative, though with the proper preparations it may prove itself to be immaterial. According to the equation suggested for behavioral effectiveness (Breitmeier, Young et al. 2006) , one would expect a redfeed regime to have compliance due to, among others, the already existing atmosphere of cooperation when it comes to fisheries management. Interconnected interplay due to the dependency of major fish stocks on redfeed as a source of feed at all developmental stages and the fluctuations of regimes that manage these fish stocks is unavoidable. Given, however, that the atmosphere of cooperation is so strong in these areas, it is likely that a redfeed regime would cooperate well with, and pass resolutions on quota distributions, in line with what is the most ecosystem viable option. Though interplay is not an element in the equation for behavioral effectiveness as measured by compliance, it is likely that it will play a role by making the distributive part of negotiations more difficult, both at the ICES level and at the level of international agreements such as the redfeed regime and the mixed Norwegian-Russian fisheries commission. It is unlikely, however, that it will have a dramatic effect on behavioral effectiveness if taken account of prior to the commencement of harvest.
Conclusion
This article has explored the remedies available to respond to declining fish stocks and lack of feed within the aquaculture industry. One such remedy has been the forthcoming redfeed fishery in the North East Atlantic and the blooming krill fishery in the Southern Ocean. Given that there is only a low level of commercial harvesting of krill at this time, and only research quotas for redfeed (Lerbukt and Groenhof 2006) , it is still too early to know which ecological consequences a plankton fishery may have in the future. The krill initiative, however, is ongoing and is on the verge of full-blown harvest, and its real life effectiveness will soon be tested. It is critical to be prepared for the eventualities that will arise once the stage is set for the commencement of a full-blown fishery on plankton in the North East Atlantic, and a comparison with the krill regime is critically informative for the successful implementation of an effecive redfeed regime.
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The Journal of Environment & Development 19(2) Management of a common property for its preservation is often provided by the establishment of an international regime for a given issue area. In this context, a blueprint for a potentially new redfeed regime in the North East Atlantic has been discussed. Equally important has been the possible interplay this regime may have with already existing regimes in the area, more specifically the mixed Norwegian-Russian fisheries commission, and whether this in turn may affect the effectiveness of the regime. The first section introduced redfeed and its importance given facts about population increases, declining fish stocks and the diminishing supply of feed for the aquaculture industry. International regimes and their effectiveness in general were discussed in the following section after which a discussion of CCAMLR was undertaken. The two regimes were then compared to determine whether or not a redfeed regime had the potential of being effective in light of the experiences of CCAMLR. Having determined that the redfeed regime would likely be behaviorally effective in terms of outcome, it was hypothesized about whether or not interplay between already existing regimes in the area could affect this effectiveness. Given the special nature of the plankton as prey for most all commercial fish stocks in the area, the term interconnected interplay was introduced.
Though speculative by nature, it is likely that with a separate regime for redfeed based on an ecosystem-based approach will likely not have a negative effect on regime effectiveness. An ecosystem-based approach would be protecting not only the plankton but also those species dependent on it for food and managed by other regimes in the area. Interconnected interplay with already existing regimes for the fish stocks that redfeed is a prey of in the area would be natural of course, but this interplay could be positive with proper preparation. The assessment is based on the calculation of compliance and the strength of the already existing fisheries cooperation context in the area. Adding a separate regime for redfeed will add more complexity to the issue of ecosystem management of a given area, and force several regimes to consider interconnected interplay before setting quotas for the fish stocks for which the given regime was created. Cooperation will therefore ensure that regime management at the bottom of the food chain in the far North will likely be positive in the long run for prey, predator, and the end consumer to name a few.
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